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Abstract
This paper shows that historical missionary activity has had a persistent effect
on schooling outcomes, and contributed to a reversal of fortunes wherein historically
richer ethnic groups are poorer today. Combining contemporary individual-level data
with a newly constructed dataset on mission stations in Nigeria, we find that individ-
uals whose ancestors were exposed to greater missionary activity have higher levels
of schooling. This effect is robust to omitted heterogeneity, ethnicity fixed effects,
and reverse causation. We find inter-generational factors and the persistence of early
advantages in educational infrastructure to be key channels through which the effect
has persisted. Consistent with theory, the effect of missions on current schooling is
larger for population subgroups that have historically suffered disadvantages in access
to education.
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1 Introduction
Let missionaries and school masters, plough and spade, go together and agriculture
will flourish, the avenues to legitimate commerce will be opened, confidence between
man and man will be inspired, whilst civilization will advance as the natural effect,
and Christianity operate as the proximate cause, of this happy change — T.F. Buxton
in The African Slave Trade, and Its Remedy (1840).
The persistent effects of historical events on contemporary economic outcomes have recently
received a lot of attention in the economics literature. Widely studied events include the effects
of European colonization, the transatlantic slave trade, and their interactions with geography.1
In comparison, the long-term effects of nineteenth century missionaries on economic development
remain underexplored in the literature.2 The arrival of Christian missionaries in Africa was an
important historical episode with a longstanding effect on African religions and cultural practices
(Sundkler and Steed, 2000; Nunn, 2010). Missionary societies were vital to nineteenth century ef-
forts to end the transatlantic slave trade, and were driven by the firm belief this would be achieved
through the introduction of Western education, and Christianity, as a means of advancing civiliza-
tion (Buxton, 1840).
This paper empirically examines the contemporary effects of nineteenth century missionary
activities in Africa. In particular, we use data from Nigeria to study the long-term effects of
historical missionary activity on schooling and wealth, and explore the reasons why the effects of
missionary activity have persisted. As in other studies examining the effects of historical shocks
on economic development within homogenous territories (see Huillery (2009), Wantchekon et al.
(2013), and Acemoglu et al. (2014)), we focus on a single country because it makes the sources of
differences in missionary activity easier to identify, and immediately accounts for any country and
colonial history fixed effects. Nigeria also presents an interesting case study because of the rich
variation in missionary activity generated by the timing of the British colonial government’s policy
of indirect rule.
As the most populous country in Africa, and a major source of slave exports to the Americas, the
area now known as Nigeria attracted several Protestant and Catholic missionaries whose primary
1Contributions to this literature are too numerous to mention, but some important empirical studies on the
effects of colonization are Acemoglu et al. (2001), Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013). The effects of the slave trade are documented in Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
Evidence on the importance of geography on African economic development can be found in Nunn and Puga
(2012), and Fenske (2013), amongst several other important contributions. Analysis of the persistent effects
of colonial investments in French West Africa can be found in Huillery (2009), and Jedwab et al. (2014)
provide some evidence from Kenya in East Africa. Nunn (2013) and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) offer
reviews of the literature documenting the importance of history for contemporary economic performance.
2Recent studies of the effects of missionary activity on schooling in Africa are Gallego and Woodberry
(2010), Nunn (2014), and Wantchekon et al. (2013). Waldinger (2013) studies the effects of Catholic mis-
sionaries in Mexico.
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method for proselytizing was the school.3 Aided by freed slaves who had been resettled in Sierra
Leone, missionary work began on the Southern coasts of the country and gradually proceeded to the
Northern hinterlands. By the early 1900’s, however, Nigeria had become an official British colony
and government administrators, who wished to govern through traditional rulers (indirect rule),
actively discouraged missionary activities in the Northern parts of the country. The effectiveness
of indirect rule, and availability of freed slaves from different ethnic groups, generated large early
differences in schooling infrastructure, and attainment, between Nigerian ethnic groups. As early as
1914, when the North and South were merged into one country, there were 37,500 primary schools
in the South, but just 1,100 primary schools in the North where the colonial government had taken
primary responsibility for schooling (Csapo, 1981).4
First, we examine the persistence of these early schooling infrastructure differences on schooling
attainment in modern Nigeria. We construct a new dataset on the location of primary mission
stations in Nigeria as at 1928, and show that, all else equal, individuals from ethnic groups with
more mission stations as at 1928 have significantly higher levels of schooling attainment today. In
the most basic specification, an additional mission station per 1000 km2 of an individual’s ethnic
homeland is associated with an additional 3.6 years of schooling, on average. This positive result is
robust to different measures of exposure to missionary activity, controls for individual and household
characteristics, and fixed effects for the individual’s state of residence.
We argue that these effects are causal, because the distribution of mission stations across ethnic
groups was primarily driven by supply-side factors: the policy of indirect rule and availability of
returnee slaves. To further address concerns about the endogeneity of mission stations to ethnic
group specific characteristics, we calculate the number of mission stations, as at 1928, per area of
current states in Nigeria.5 We use the fact that individuals from the same ethnic group have been
split into various states to estimate a model with ethnicity fixed effects. The persistent effect of
mission stations on schooling remains strong and positive using the state-based measure.
Furthermore, we use an ethnic group’s distance to the coast, and Timbuktu, Mali, as instru-
ments for the intensity of Christian missionary activity. Distance to the coast is negatively as-
sociated with missionary activity because it meant that missionaries were more likely to arrive
3The most active missionary societies in Nigeria were Baptists, Irish and French Catholics (Spiritans and
the SMA), the Anglican C.M.S., Presbyterians and Wesleyan Methodists.
4The populations of Northern and Southern Nigeria have always been roughly equal ((Coleman, 1963,
Table 1),(Ostien, 2012)). The emphasis on primary education is important because this is the level of
education at which missionaries invested their efforts. In comparison to the number of primary schools,
there were less than 15 secondary schools in the country as at 1914 (Ajayi et al., 1996), because missionaries
saw no evangelistic purpose to higher education (Ayandele, 1966, p. 284–290, 293).
5See Aghalino and Danmole (1995) for a brief history of state creation in Nigeria; the authors find that
state boundaries are arbitrary and politically motivated, unrelated to any observable characteristics. Also,
Johnson (1967) finds that access to clean water, high altitude with a comfortable climate, and the possibility
of establishing contact with Europe for supplies determined the locations of the mission stations within an
area. If individuals in states with the above factors also have greater demand for education, the location
of mission stations could be statistically endogenous to state-specific characteristics. To deal with this
possibility, we control for state-level geographic variables in the regressions.
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later in the time period when indirect rule became effective. Distance to Timbuktu, which was
an important centre for trade and Islamic scholarship in pre-colonial West Africa (Lulat, 2005), is
positively associated with missionary activity. This is because distance to Timbuktu would have
led to less competition from Islamic missionaries. From the IV results, we find that an additional
mission station, per 1000 km2 of an individual’s ethnic homeland, increases years of schooling by
2.17 years on average.
The above results are consistent with the findings of Nunn (2014), Gallego and Woodberry
(2010), and Wantchekon et al. (2013), but our paper differs from theirs in scope and other important
respects. We empirically investigate reasons why the effect of missions on schooling has persisted
at the level of the ethnic group. The persistence of the effect of early missions on schooling we
find is a little puzzling because Nigeria has been governed as a single entity since 1914 (Falola and
Heaton, 2008). We find that controlling for household characteristics, especially wealth, significantly
reduces the point estimate for the impact of missionary activity across most specifications. This
is consistent with Wantchekon et al. (2013), who use data from Benin to show that the inter-
generational transmission of human capital is important for the sustained effects of missionary
activity on schooling. 6
In addition to the inter-generational transmission channel, we find that the missionary effect on
education has been sustained because of increased schooling infrastructure in areas with historically
more missionary activities. Two features of the data provide direct support for the infrastructure
explanation: First, individuals from ethnic groups exposed to greater historical missionary activity
tend to live in areas with more schooling infrastructure, even controlling for demand for schooling.
Secondly, we find that the positive effect of historical missionary activity on schooling is only robust
at basic levels of education, which is exactly the level of education at which missionaries focused
their education investments.7 The persistence of historical missionary investments in primary
education is consistent with the results in Huillery (2009) on the persistence of French colonial
infrastructure investments.
Based on a model of education infrastructure and schooling, we generate some predictions
that allow us to test the heterogeneous effects of historical missionary activity. We find that the
6Some studies emphasize the differences between Catholics and Protestants in education. We do not
distinguish between types of missions (Catholics v. Protestants), because all missions aggressively adopted
schools as the primary method for gaining converts in Nigeria and schooling efforts by Catholic missions
were even more successful in some parts of Nigeria. Catholic and Protestant missions actively competed
for converts using schools and health services as enticements for young children and their parents. In 1886
a C.M.S. schoolmaster complained that the Catholic Spiritans have “taken from our school about a dozen
children over whose parents they had exercised some influence” (Okwu, 2010, p.127). Another complained
in 1895 that ”the Romanists...seek to win our children to their schools, they visit the houses of our converts,
they try to bribe the most able of our teachers” (Okwu, 2010, p.111). In fact, at some point in the early
twentieth century, enrolment in Catholic schools was greater and outpaced enrolment in Protestant schools
by a significant margin in Eastern Nigeria (see (Ayandele, 1966, p.302) and Table 1 in (Okwu, 2010, p.164).
7The importance of schooling infrastructure is also supported by evidence from Benin, where Wantchekon
et al. (2013) find that villages with missionary schools in the colonial period have higher levels of schooling
today, compared to neighbouring villages with no missionary schools.
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sustained effect of missionary activity is not religion specific, and Muslims from ethnic groups
exposed to more missionary activity also have significantly higher levels of schooling compared to
other Muslims. Thus, the effect of missions on schooling is not primarily a result of religion and
demand for schooling. Consistent with the model, the point estimates reveal that the effect of
missionary activity on schooling is stronger among Muslims, because of the lower average levels of
schooling infrastructure in Muslim areas.
Our estimates also show that the sustained effect of missionary activity on schooling is predomi-
nantly from differential female education across ethnic groups. The predominant effect of missionary
activity on female education is also consistent with our model of increased education infrastructure
in an environment, like Nigeria’s, with labour market discrimination against females.8 Thus, an
increase in schooling infrastructure from missionary activity in an area lowers the marginal cost of
education, and encourages relatively more female education. A preference for male education in
the early missionary period as a result of economic realities is also supported by some historical
evidence; for example, the Chiefs of Bonny, in Southern Nigeria, asked in 1877, “what profit is there
to us for girls?” They felt that female education was not profitable because “they cannot trade on
board ships when they grow up only live in the house” (Tasie, 1978, as quoted in p.34).
The results of this paper have implications for the importance of human capital, in addition to
institutions, for the reversal of fortunes in Africa upon European contact (Acemoglu et al., 2002).
Our estimates reveal that the effectiveness of indirect rule among ethnic groups with stronger pre-
colonial institutions led to less exposure to missionary activity in Nigeria. Thus, these ethnic groups
are now significantly less wealthy partly as a result of the educational advantages brought about
by missionary activity.
Our study also contributes to the literature on the historical determinants of comparative
economic development in Africa. It is related to Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2014) who
find that national institutions are not strongly related to subnational development in Africa. Our
findings show that this may be explained by differential exposure to historical shocks across ethnic
groups within a country. In the Nigerian context, ethnic groups exposed to more missionary activity
gained an advantage in education infrastructure which has been sustained 100 years after Nigeria
was amalgamated into one country in 1914.
Last, but not the least, our paper provides further insight into the long-term effects of the
transatlantic slave trade in Africa. Nunn (2008) finds that countries with higher levels of exposure
to the slave trade have lower incomes per capita, and in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), the authors
find that this may have been due to the negative effect of the slave trade on social capital. In
Nigeria, we find that, by acting as a stimulant for missionary activity, historical exposure to the
slave trade is positively related to schooling and is reflected in higher contemporary wealth. Thus
the effect of the slave trade on income may be different at the individual level, within a country,
8Evidence on trends in gender wage discrimination is discussed in Blau and Kahn (2000), and Oostendorp
(2009) presents evidence on the gender gap in earnings using cross-country wage data.
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compared to aggregate effects across countries. This indicates that the positive human capital effect
of missions might have more than compensated for the deleterious effects of the slave trade within
countries.
In the next section we present a historical background for missionary activity, and discuss the
construction of the dataset in section 3. Section 4 presents a simple model of education infrastruc-
ture and schooling, in the presence of labour market discrimination, which provides the context for
all the empirical results that follow in section 5. The final section concludes.
2 Historical Background
In this section, we present a brief discussion of the factors behind the distribution of mission
stations in Nigeria. We find that supply-side factors were primarily responsible for the distribution
of mission stations between ethnic groups as at 1928, as opposed to initial differences in the demand
for education, or missionary activity, across ethnic groups.
Motivations for Missionary Activity
To understand the primary factors driving missionary activity in West Africa, we begin with a dis-
cussion of the motivations behind increased missionary activity in the nineteenth century. Christian
missionaries arriving in nineteenth century West Africa were keenly aware of the failures of earlier
missionary activities, as well as the tremendous gains Islam had made in the intervening period.
Spurred on by T.F. Buxton’s The African slave trade and its remedy published in 1839, and the
evangelical revival of John Wesley in Britain, missionaries were eager to reach as many African
societies as they could. This grew out of the perceived need to advance civilization, curb the slave
trade, and counteract the spread of Islam.
The work of T.F. Buxton was instrumental in convincing the British public to finance the Niger
Expedition of 1841, at a cost of about £100,000 (about £280 million in 2010). The expedition failed
and of the 145 Europeans on board, 130 contracted malaria fever and 40 had died within a year
((Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p.224),(Ajayi, 1965, p.7-8)). However, this failure did not discourage
missionary activity, instead it cemented the need for African missionaries who could survive in
the West African environment. The necessity of having African converts who would be able to
carry on the missionary work from the Coasts to the hinterlands created an important link between
education and missionary activity. Thus, mass education was necessary to expand the supply of
missionaries in Nigeria, and elsewhere in tropical West Africa (Ajayi, 1965; Tasie, 1978, Chapter
1).9
9Frankema (2012) also finds the Africanization of various missions across Africa and argues that this was
necessary to meet growing demand. In contrast, we are arguing that missionaries were willing to reach every
community regardless of demand conditions, but climatic conditions made Africanization necessary. As we
show later with some examples, invitations for missionaries came from sections of every major ethnic group,
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Missionary Activity and the Legacy of Slavery
In the meantime, the different missions (Baptists, Catholics, C.M.S., Presbyterians, Wesleyan
Methodists) had to look to the liberated African slaves living in Sierra Leone to carry on the
missionary work. The ethnic backgrounds of these Sierra Leonean returnees became the primary
factor behind the historical variation in missionary activity between Southern ethnic groups (see
Figure 1). The demand for schooling, and missionaries, was high among various Southern groups.
Some groups were motivated by the protection missionary presence afforded them in times of war
(especially in Yorubaland in the Southwest), and others in the Southeast were primarily motivated
by the need to have their communities participate in the growing trade in legitimate commodities
(Ajayi, 1965, p.134).10
Even with the high demand, the supply of missions to any ethnic group over this period was
limited, and was greatly influenced by the availability of recaptured slaves living in Sierra Leone,
who spoke the local language (or a variant). Thus, the larger number of slaves exported from
the major southern ethnic groups (Ibo and Yoruba) early in the nineteenth century, meant that
they also received a larger supply of missionaries eager to return “home” (Ajayi, 1965, Chapter
2). Recaptured slaves from these ethnic groups also wrote letters to different missions requesting
that missionaries be sent to their hometowns (Tasie, 1978, p.14–16). The same was true for the
Ibibio (Efiks), who controlled the slave port of Calabar. Efiks in Jamaica were instrumental to the
founding of the United Presbyterian Calabar in 1846 (Tasie, 1978, p.16).
The other large Southern ethnic group, the Ijaws, controlled the ports on the Bight of Biafra
through which slaves were exported, but did not export members of their own ethnic groups in
significant numbers (Tasie, 1978, p.14–17). Other Southern groups included in this study did
not have significant slaves exported from their own communities early in the nineteenth century,
perhaps due to declining population densities from slave raiding in earlier time periods. In sum,
ethnic groups that accounted for most of the slaves exports in the nineteenth century, from the
Bights of Benin and Biafra, also had a larger supply of missionaries because they were able to
attract missionaries who spoke their native languages. This supply side factor primarily explains
the variation in missionary activity between ethnic groups in the South of Nigeria. .11
Next, we turn to explaining the larger variation of missionary activity between Northern and
Southern Nigeria, and we find that restrictions on supply played the significant role.
including the Muslim Hausas of the North.
10In the major trading town of Bonny, for example, the Chiefs of Bonny provided about £300 towards
the erection of a missionary house in the community (Tasie, 1978, p.30). The King of Calabar also invited
missionaries in 1841, hoping they would be of assistance towards his goal of gaining control of a neighbouring
town (Berman, 1974).
11The patterns in slave trading described here are also confirmed in the estimates of slave exports by
ethnicity in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). A regression of the number of slaves per square km, taken from
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), on the number of missions per square km has an R2 of .34. Including a
measure of the ethnic group’s distance to sea increases the R2 to .44.
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Missionary Activity in the North: Legacy of Indirect Rule
One reason for the lack of missionary activity in the North is geographic; the South is closer to
the Atlantic Coast, so it was easier and less risky for missionaries to set up stations in those areas.
However, by 1900, the British colonial administration already had a significant presence in Northern
Nigeria and the area was accessible to European traders and missionaries (Ayandele, 1966, p.120–
126). By 1911, there was a rail line going from Lagos to Kano in the heart of the North, and by 1926,
another line went from Port Harcourt in the Southeast to another major Northern city, Kaduna.
Furthermore, Europeans had made contact with the Northern Emirates as early as 1821 (Sundkler
and Steed, 2000, p.254), and attempted to establish a mission station in the Illorin Emirate as early
as 1855. There were various attempts to establish mission stations in Northern Nigeria between
1855 and 1900, which were met with varying degrees of success (Ajayi, 1965, p.97). Similar to the
activities of the Southern ethnic groups, a Kanuri recaptive Wesleyan agent, W. Allakurah Sharpe,
had also desperately pleaded with the Wesleyan mission to send missionaries to Kanuris in the
Northeast of Nigeria in 1879 (Ayandele, 1966, p.118).
Distance to sea explains why missionaries arrived in Northern Nigeria in great numbers much
later in the time period under consideration, but does not explain why they never set up significant
numbers of mission stations by 1928.12 Take for example, the case of the Ibo ethnic group in
Southern Nigeria; missionaries did not penetrate the Ibo hinterlands until after the Aro Expedition
of 1902 (Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p.248-253), but from Figure 1, we see that a significant number
of mission stations had been established in Ibo areas by 1928. Thus, timing, or inaccessibility, does
not fully explain why missionaries failed to penetrate the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri areas of the
North, that were already under British control by 1903.
The absence of missionary activity in Northern Nigeria was, above all, a result of the colonial
government’s policy of “indirect rule” established around 1900. Indirect rule meant that the pro-
tectorate of Northern Nigeria would be administered by the Emirs of the Islamic Sokoto Caliphate
in the Northwest, and the Islamic Borno Emirate in the Northeast. The policy strengthened
the opposition of the Islamic Northern rulers to Christianity, and the administration opted for
government-provided schools in order to preserve the power of the Emirs.
Furthermore, missionary activity in Northern Nigeria was significantly restricted by the pol-
icy prohibiting missionary activity from most parts of Northern Nigeria under the control of the
Emirs (Ayandele, 1966, Chapter 4);(Barnes, 1995).13 The colonial government’s attitude towards
missionary activity in the North is perhaps best illustrated by the statement below:
12The mean number of missions per 1000km2 is .7 in the South, but only .05 in the North.
13This did not entirely eliminate missionary activity from the area, as several pagan ethnic groups in the
North, who were not under the direct political control of the Emirates saw significant missionary activity
among the Tiv, Igala, and Idoma peoples (Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p. 257–259)(Ayandele, 1966, p.117).
Historical records also indicate the establishment of mission stations in parts of the Emirate at Bida, Kon-
tagora, and Zaria. Led by the evangelist Dr. Walter Miller, several European missionaries also preached in
the large cities of the Emirates without the government’s approval (Ayandele, 1966, p.133).
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Personally I should like to see the Missions withdraw entirely from the Northern States,
for the best missionary for the present will be the high-minded clean living British
Resident. — Sir Percy Girouard, Governor of Northern Nigeria (1907-1909), as quoted
in (Ayandele, 1966, p.116).
Indirect rule was primarily necessitated by the loose political grip the government had on the
vast areas of Nigeria (Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p. 255), as well as the limited resources available
to administer the area (Ayandele, 1966, 145). Secondly, the administration did not want to create
more trouble for themselves in Northern Nigeria, especially not of the religious kind. As Lord
Salibury said in an address to the Wesleyan Missionary Society in 1900, “You will not convert
them...and the danger of creating great perils and producing great convulsions, and it may be
bloodshed..., is a danger you must bear in mind” (as quoted in (Ayandele, 1966, p.137)). This
was a conflict the colonial government wanted to avoid as much as possible, as they believed that
allowing missionary activity in a region dominated by Islam would be tantamount to preaching at
gunpoint (Barnes, 1995). The administration also believed that the effect of Islam on Northern
peoples has been positive, and was best suited to Africans as a “religion of the tropics” (Sundkler
and Steed, 2000, p.256).
Other colonial officials believed that imposing Christianity on the Emirate would lead to dis-
order, and would amount to “...[replacing] a patriarchal and venerable system of government by
a discontented and irresponsible democracy of semi-educated politicians [referring to the African
converts of the time]” (Hesketh Bell, quoted in (Ayandele, 1966, p. 149)). The administration also
developed significant antipathy towards African converts to Christianity, and consistently cited the
breakdown of law and order among some of the Southern peoples, and the difficulty of managing
“Black White Men,” as evidence for the wisdom of indirect rule (Barnes (1995) presents a thorough
discussion of the administration’s views towards African converts).14
The net result of indirect rule was that missions could not rely on the support of British force
in the face of opposition as they had enjoyed in Southern Nigeria. Not only did the colonial
administration withdraw support for missionary activity in Northern Nigeria, they actively sought
to slow down extant missionary activities. There are cases of Northern ethnic groups, such as
the Maguzawa (an Hausa subgroup), who had their requests for missionaries turned down on the
grounds that it would create disloyalty to the Muslim rulers. Another example could be found in
the actions of the Resident, Captain Orr, who desired to move the mission station in Zaria outside
of the city, and in Kano where the mission station was actually moved outside the city in order to
avoid missionary contact with the native population (see pages 146-152 in Ayandele (1966)). As
a result of these and other actions, the administrators in Northern Nigeria were accused of being
pro-Islam by the missions (Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p.256).
14Some of the antipathy is of course motivated by the early nationalist sentiments already developing
among the educated Southerners, their refusal to submit to forced labour schemes, and other anti-colonial
activities (see page 434 in (Barnes, 1995).)
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A few missionary schools that were established in Northern Nigeria operated under the condition
that religious education would not to be permitted. When the Emirs protested against these schools,
the administration had some of them closed (Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p.256). This is in stark
contrast to earlier attitudes when missionaries faced local opposition. For example, when the
people of Badagry (on the Atlantic Coast) decided to expel the missionaries in 1845, the British
government responded by sending a cruiser, H.M.S. Albatross (Ajayi, 1965, p.37). Or consider the
fate of Old Town of Calabar, which was destroyed by the Royal Navy for attempting to impede
missionary activities in 1855 (Ayandele, 1966, p.22–24). A last example is the military expedition
against the Ijebus (a Yoruba sub-group) between 1890-1891, which was brought about by opposition
to missionary activity (and trade disputes) in Yorubaland (Ayandele, 1966, p. 54–68).
The above examples illustrate the point that opposition to missions by Northern rulers was only
made effective by the colonial administration’s attitude towards missionary activity. Prior to the
implementation of indirect rule, several mission stations were successfully set up in Northern cities
at the request of the administration (Ayandele, 1966, p.141–142). If missionaries had the support
of the administration, the opposition of the Northern Emirs, like that of other rulers in the South,
would have come to nought in the face of a superior British military force.15
In a bid to satisfy the demand for schooling in the North, the government decided to establish
non-missionary schools in the North, and the effort was spearheaded by the famous Sir Hanns
Vischer (Sundkler and Steed, 2000, p.256). Nevertheless, the government’s effort could not match
the more organic community-focused effort of the missionaries. As early as 1914, there were already
37,500 primary schools in the South, but just 1,100 primary schools in the North with an equal
population. In a country where 97% of the student population were enrolled in missionary schools
as at 1942, the negative effects of this infrastructural deficit was already apparent in significantly
lower literacy rates (in Roman scripts) among ethnic groups of Northern Nigeria as at 1952 (Barnes,
1995; Prothero, 1956). We study the sustained impact of these differences in the historical supply
of schools, brought about by missionary activity, on modern day Nigeria.
3 Data
The dataset is built on the male and female individual recode files from the Nigerian 2008 Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS). The DHS is a survey implemented in several countries with a
focus on obtaining comprehensive information on nationally-representative households, and selected
individuals within the household. The DHS provides data on years of schooling, level of education
completed, and several demographic variables for individuals and the households in which they live.
The DHS provides information on ethnicity for over 30,000 individuals, between the ages of 15-59,
15This is not to say that missions would have gained converts in these areas mostly governed by Islamic
rulers. Evidence from other parts of Nigeria indicates that, even with the establishment of mission stations,
missions found it difficult to attract converts without military intervention (Okwu, 2010).
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belonging to the ten major ethnic groups that make up about 90% of the country’s population.
Data on the location of mission stations in Nigeria are taken from two sources. The first is a
map published by Roome (1925) showing the location of principal mission stations (Protestant and
Catholic) in Africa in 1924. The map, which is highly regarded as accurate, is also used in Nunn
(2014), and several other papers.16 We combine the map from Roome (1925) with another map,
from Ayandele (1966), which provides the location of mission stations in Southern and Northern
Nigeria as at 1928. Information from both maps were manually cross-checked, and in order to
minimize the risk of double-counting, we add a mission station from Ayandele (1966) if it does not
belong to the same local government area (a county in the U.S.) as the mission station in Roome
(1925). There is significant overlap in both maps, but the map from Ayandele (1966) provides
information on 30 additional mission locations (out of 159) in Nigeria.
We use three different measures of historic exposure to missionary activity: two are related to
the individual’s ethnicity, and the third is related to the individual’s current state of residence. We
use differences in the distribution of missions across different states inhabited by an ethnic group to
identify the effect of missions within an ethnic group. For the ethnicity based measure, we combine
the map of mission stations with information on the land area historically inhabited by different
ethnic groups provided on a map by the anthropologist G.P. Murdock (Murdock, 1959).
Using the map by Murdock (1959), we compute the number of mission stations per 1000 km2
of the individual’s ethnic homeland. The 10 major ethnic groups, their homelands, and the mission
stations located within them are shown in Figure 1. However, given that all individuals within an
ethnic group may not have equal access to these mission stations, we also compute the number
of mission stations within 25 and 50 kilometre radii of the geometric centre of the individual’s
homeland, as shown in Figure 2.17 The measures of missionary activity turn out to be highly
correlated, with Spearman rank correlation coefficients above above .82 for the centroid-based and
area-based measures, and a rank coefficient of .95 for both centroid-based measures. We use similar
methods to compute the number of mission stations per 1000 km2 of the individual’s current state
of residence. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the measure based on ethnic
homeland and current state of resident is .8, and a Pearson correlation coefficient of .76.
16Some authors make the distinction between Catholic and Protestant missions, but this distinction is not
particularly relevant in Nigeria as both mission types actively competed for converts using education as an
inducement. In fact, in the Eastern part of Nigeria, enrollment in schools run by Catholic missions outpaced
that of Protestant missions (Ayandele, 1966, p.302).
17For example, among the Hausa ethnic group, the mission stations were located on the outskirts of their
homeland (in Kano, Zaria). As will be made clear later on, this was in response to colonial policy of keeping
missionaries away from proselytizing among the Islamic Hausas. These stations effectively served early
Christian converts who had migrated from the South (Barnes, 1995; Ayandele, 1966).
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Figure 1: Mission stations within ethnic homelands (as dots)
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Figure 2: Mission stations within 25 and 50 km radii of centroid of ethnic homeland
Figure 3: Mission stations within states of Nigeria
Individual level controls include age, age-squared, occupation (in 8 groups), sex, and type of
residence (urban or rural). We also include controls for the individual’s household which may
influence investments in schooling. These include the age and sex of the household head, the size of
the individual’s household, and an index of household wealth. All individual and household control
variables are taken directly from the DHS.
We also make use of ethnicity level controls that may influence an ethnic group’s outlook towards
education. We include estimates of the population density of the individual’s ethnic homeland dur-
ing the colonial period taken from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). Ethnicity-level controls include
an indicator for the presence of a city in the individual’s ethnic homeland in the fifteenth century,
and a measure of organizational hierarchies beyond the local community of the ethnic group also
taken from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), with the ultimate source being the Ethnographic Atlas
by Murdock (1967). These are all different measures of the prosperity of the ethnic group during
the pre-colonial period. We do not include controls for contact with Europeans, or controls con-
trolling for ease of European access to the ethnic group’s homeland for Europeans. As noted in the
historical discussion, these latter missionaries were mostly Africans (see (Ajayi, 1965, p.11)), and
had no problems making contact with all the major ethnic groups by 1903.
The last set of data we use are geographic data across states in Nigeria, including suitability
of land for agriculture. Land suitability may have influenced schooling outcomes because in areas
where farming was viable, parents were less likely to send their children to school, because edu-
cation often meant leaving farmwork (Ayandele, 1966, p.296). Data on the suitability of land for
agriculture is obtained from the geographic section of the 2010 General Household Survey (GHS),
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published by NBS (2013). We use three measures of land suitability to agriculture for each state:
the first is an increasing scale of “workability,” which is measured for 10 enumeration areas within
each state. We take the population-weighted average of land workability for residents in a state as
the state’s measure of land workability. The second measure is a set of indicator variables for the
terrain in the state (plain, lowland, plateau, hilly), and the last is a set of indicator variables for
the state’s agricultural zone (tropic-cool/subhumid, tropic-warm/semiarid, tropic-warm/subhumid,
tropic-warm/humid).
Summary statistics are shown in Table 1, which presents the means of some key variables
across the ten ethnic groups. Full summary statistics are show in Table 13 of the appendix. We see
systematic variation in the number of missions across various ethnic groups, with the ethnic groups
of Northern Nigeria that were exposed to indirect rule (Hausa, Kanuri, and Fulani) having almost
no mission stations. While the number of mission stations per 1000 km2 is our preferred measure of
exposure to missionary activity, we also use the number of mission stations within a 25 km and a 50
km radius of the ethnicity’s homeland as alternate measures. As already mentioned earlier, these
measures are quite correlated, and the rankings are generally consistent across measures. Lastly,
notice the correlation between the number of slaves exported from an ethnic group’s homeland and
the number of missions per 1000 km2. For example, the Ibo had one of the highest numbers of
slave exports at 2.5, and also has one of the highest numbers of missions at 1.11. This can be
contrasted with the Ekoi who had comparatively fewer slaves exported from their homeland (.2),
and also fewer subsequent missionary activity (.08).
Table 1: Some Summary Statistics
Ethnicity Variables Individual Variables Household Variables
Missions
Ethnicity Per 1000 km2 25 km 50 km Slave Exports Schooling Male Age Size Wealth Rural
Ekoi 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.20 5.45 0.48 29.34 6.37 2.97 0.76
Fulani 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.50 30.09 7.67 1.65 0.88
Hausa 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.68 1.79 0.49 30.09 7.82 2.41 0.74
Ibibio 2.00 6.00 15.00 1.91 6.09 0.47 29.30 6.10 3.80 0.66
Igala 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 4.86 0.50 28.48 7.22 3.17 0.69
Ibo 1.11 2.00 13.00 2.50 6.01 0.46 30.07 5.72 3.85 0.48
Ijaw 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.99 5.79 0.48 29.15 5.58 3.18 0.82
Kanuri 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.95 0.50 30.01 7.36 2.00 0.66
Tiv 0.18 3.00 3.00 0.02 3.73 0.49 27.95 7.89 2.02 0.79
Yoruba 0.23 1.00 5.00 2.71 6.12 0.48 30.22 5.43 4.04 0.40
We also briefly examine the relationship between average years of schooling and missionary
activity. Again, we find the Northern ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri),e exposed to very
little missionary activity, also have the lowest average years of schooling. For example, the average
years of schooling among Hausas is just .82 years, compared to 6 years for the Yorubas. The
composition of males amongst the ethnic groups, as well as average ages of individuals, do not
seem to vary systematically with missionary activity. Lastly, wealth, as measured in the DHS, also
appears to be lower among the Northern ethnic groups. Some of this wealth differential could be
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due to the schooling differences between ethnic groups, and other factors unrelated to missionary
activity.
Next, we systematically assess the relationship between the exposure of an individual’s ethnic
group to missionary activity and current schooling outcomes. We begin with a simple model illus-
trating how increases in infrastructure translates into higher schooling attainment. The model also
generates some predictions that we test in the data; specifically, the model predicts that marginal
impact of missionary activity should be greater in Muslim areas with less average missionary ac-
tivity, and also greater for females as a result of wage discrimination.
4 A Model of Schooling and Schooling Infrastructure
Let i be an individual who has to decide on the amount of education he/she would like to acquire.
The benefits of education such as higher incomes, better living standards, prestige, and knowledge,
increase with the level of education. Education is also costly to acquire, and the cost is lower
with a higher supply of educational infrastructure. By education infrastructure, we mean physical
infrastructure, as well as the availability of teachers and teaching materials used in schools.
Individual i’s utility function is:18
u(e) = αb(e)− c(e)I
Where e is the amount of education, b(e) the benefit of acquiring e units of education, and c(e)
the cost of e units of education. The parameter α denotes the degree of gender discrimination in
the labour market, and we assume α = 1 if i is male, and 0 < α < 1 if i is female. We include
this parameter to recognize substantial labour market discrimination against women in Nigeria, as
documented in Aromolaran (2006). The quantity of available educational infrastructure is denoted
by I. For simplicity, e and I are assumed to be positive real numbers. Also, b is assumed to be
twice-continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave, and c is assumed to be twice-
continuously differentiable, increasing, and strictly convex.
Individual i maximizes his or her utility function by choosing the optimal amount of education
e∗ given I > 0. From the first order condition of the consumer problem, we know that at the
optimal level of education, marginal benefits must equal marginal costs:




The first implication of the model which we test is given by proposition 1 below:
18Note that an alternative way to model educational choice would be to assume that i derives utility from
consumption, but consumption depends on income (first constraint), and income depends on education level
(second constraint incorporating a parameter of income discrimination against females). Also, education is
costly, but the cost is lower with higher educational infrastructure (budget constraint). Solving this problem
will be similar to the one we solve.
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Proposition 1. The optimal amount of education, e∗, is increasing in the amount of education
infrastructure, I.
To see why proposition 1 is true, note that the function g is decreasing in education because
the marginal benefit, b, is decreasing in education and the marginal cost, c is increasing. Increasing
the quantity of education infrastructure lowers the marginal cost, which means that g(e, I) > 0.
By the assumptions on b() and c(), the intermediate value theorem implies that the quantity of
education must increase to equate marginal benefits and costs as in equation (1). Our primary
argument in the rest of the paper is that the sustained increase in schooling across ethnic groups
is driven by the increase in education infrastructure brought by missionaries, once we control for
inter-generational factors.
Next, we explore other results which we use to test the implications of the model. The model
also implies that in the presence of gender discrimination against females, 0 < α < 1, the marginal
impact of missionary activity driven by increases in infrastructure would be greater for females.
This is summarized in proposition 2 below:
Proposition 2. The marginal effect of increasing education infrastructure on schooling attainment
is decreasing in α. Thus, as long as there is some wage discrimination against females compared
to males, 0 < α < 1, the marginal impact of missionary education on schooling would be larger for
women.
To show the proposition above formally, we apply the implicit function theorem to equation








Given that c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, b′′ < 0, equation (2) implies that the impact of increases in
infrastructure is higher for females, because the denominator in (2) is smaller when 0 < α < 1.
The intuition for this result is as follows: wage discrimination implies that females have higher
marginal benefits to education because they choose lower levels of schooling in equlibrium. With an
increase in infrastructure, the marginal increase in educational attainment would be more responsive
for women compared to men who already have higher levels of education and lower marginal
benefits. In the extreme case, think of a community where all males must go to school first before
females because of infrastructural constraints. The responsiveness of female education to expanded
infrastructure would be greater than that of males, because more males are already in school.
Lastly, the model implies that the marginal effect of educational infrastructure on the optimal

















Given that c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, and b′′ < 0, equation (3) implies that d
2e∗
dI2
< 0 . The result implies that
within groups with less historical missionary activity, and less supply of educational infrastructure
today, the marginal effect of missionary activities on educational attainment would be larger. This
is an immediate implication of decreasing marginal benefit to education for an individual, so that
further reductions in costs would lead to smaller increases in educational attainment. The third
result is summarized below:
Proposition 3. The marginal effect of increasing education infrastructure on schooling attainment
is decreasing in the amount of infrastructure, I.
Importantly, the result means that the marginal effect of missionary activity on schooling would
be greater for ethnic groups with less average historical exposure to missionaries. This is a result
that illustrates the contrast between our model and models where missionaries simply increased
tastes for education (benefits). In such a model, the impact of missionary activity would be greater
in areas with more missionary activity where one would expect the change in tastes to be greater.




We first examine the relationship between mission stations in 1928 and the schooling attainment
of individuals in modern Nigeria. The most general equation we estimate is:
Yi,e,h,s = αs + βMe + XiΠ + XeΛ + XhΓ + i,e,h,s. (4)
The independent variable is years of schooling for individual i, who belongs to ethnic group
e, household h, and lives in state s. The key variable in the estimation is Me which measures
the exposure of the individual’s ethnic group to missionary activity. We measure this variable in
three ways: one is the number of mission stations per 1000 km2 of the ethnic group’s ancestral
homeland, and the other two are the number of mission stations within 25 and 50 km radii of
the centroid of the ethnic group’s ancestral homeland. We also include state fixed effects, αs, to
capture state-specific characteristics which may influence education attainment.19
We include individual level controls, Xi, which include age, age-squared, occupation (in 8
groups), sex, and type of residence (urban or rural) in all regressions. It is not clear that occupation
should be included as a control variable, because missions could influence schooling and subsequent
19It should be noted that these states are somewhat arbitrary creations, and have grown from 2 (North
and South) in 1914 to 36 today. It is unlikely that these states are systematically correlated with missionary
activity beyond the fact that individuals from the same ethnic groups are likely to belong to the same state.
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choice of occupation. On the other hand, it could be that missionary activities increased the demand
for education by introducing occupations requiring more schooling. We control for occupation in
order to focus on the impact of missionary activity through increases in the supply of education.20
Thus, our estimates may be interpreted as the effect of missionary activity on schooling, controlling
for the effect of missionary activity on schooling through choices of occupation.
We also include household controls which are contained are in Xh, and these include the size of
the household, age and sex of the household head, and household wealth. We control for household
wealth in order to account for inter-generational effects of missionary activity. Additionally, as our
focus is on increases in the supply of schooling brought about by missionary activity, we control for
any inter-generational wealth effects on the demand for schooling, which might have been brought
about by early exposure to missionary schools. Some regressions include ethnicity controls that
may be correlated with missionary activity in Xe, which includes an indicator for the presence of a
city in 1400, the organizational structure of the ethnic group, and population density in the colonial
era. Lastly, all standard errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit, and there are over 600
clusters in all regressions.
Table 2: Missionary Activity and Years of Schooling
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
Missions (1) (2) (3)
Per 1000 km2 3.611*** 1.703*** 0.542**
[19.01] [14.20] [3.14]
Within 25 km 1.352*** 0.700*** 0.257***
[3.79] [10.73] [3.33]
Within 50 km 0.389*** 0.193*** 0.104***
[22.76] [15.94] [5.35]
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34187 34187 34187 34076 34076 34076 34076 34076 34076
Adjusted R2 0.382 0.373 0.409 0.552 0.555 0.558 0.628 0.629 0.63
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Individual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, sex, and 8 occupation dummies, are
included in all regressions. Household controls include the household size, sex of the household head, age of
the household head, and wealth of the household. State fixed effects include fixed effects for 36 states and
the federal capital territory.
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates from a regression of years of schooling on various measures of
missionary activity by ethnic group. The general result is that the exposure of an individual’s ethnic
group to missionary activity, in 1928, has a large and significant effect on current education. The
20On this note, we find that not controlling for occupation (especially professionals), increases the point
estimate of the impact of missionaries on schooling by about .1 years.
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estimates in first three columns (1), which do not include any controls for household characteristics
and state fixed effects, shows that an extra mission station per 1000 km2 of an individual’s ethnic
homeland is associated with 3.6 extra years of schooling on average. Using the number of mission
stations within 25 km of the centroid of the ethnic group, the estimates imply that an extra mission
station is associated with an additional 1.35 years of schooling. An additional mission station within
50 km of the ethnic group’s centroid, increases years of schooling by .389 years.
When we control for household characteristics in the next set of columns (2), we see that the
effects of missions on current years of schooling falls by half, which suggests that some of the effect
of missionary activity could be explained by the effect of missionaries on parents. This decline in
the effect of missions is approximately the same across the three different measures, which gives us
some confidence in the effect we are estimating, and in our measures of missionary exposure.
Household characteristics reflect the importance of inter-generational transmission mechanisms,
as individuals from ethnic groups exposed to missionary activity live in households with higher levels
of wealth (as we show in section 5.5. below). These effects account for about half of the impact of
missionary activity on current years of schooling.
The last set of results in (3), controls for state fixed effects. Again, the decline in our point
estimates are the same across all measures (with the exception of missions within a 50 km radius.
These estimates show that even with state fixed effects, an extra mission station per 1000 km2 of
the individual’s ethnic homeland, increases schooling by about half a year. Note that even though
the point estimate falls with distance from the ethnic group’s homeland, the economic significance
of mission stations does not change with the measure of exposure to missionary activity. This
is best seen by looking at standardized coefficients that account for differences in the standard
deviations of our measures of intensity of missionary activity.
The beta-coefficients are shown in Table 3, and reveal that the effect of mission stations is
quite uniform across all 3 measures. Without controlling for household and state fixed effects, a
one standard deviation increase in the number of mission stations, within an individual’s ethnic
homeland, increases years of schooling by about .31 of a standard deviation. This falls to about .15
of a standard deviation once we include household controls (household wealth importantly). The
standardized effect of mission stations per 1000 km2 once we control for state fixed effects is .049 of
a standard deviation. This is very similar to the standardized effect of .047 for the effect of mission
stations on schooling across Africa reported by Nunn (2014) using a different dataset. Given the
stability of the estimates across different measures, we use the number of missions per 1000 km2
as the measure of missionary activity in most of the estimations that follow.21
21Also examining Table 3 above, we see that the number of missions per 1000km2 tend to have the smallest
standardized coefficient. Using this measure allows us to be as conservative as possible with our estimates.
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Table 3: Missionary Activity and Years of Schooling (Standardized Coefficients)
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
Missions (1) (2) (3)
Per 1000 km2 0.325*** 0.153*** 0.049***
[75.35] [38.38] [6.77]
Within 25 km 0.309*** 0.160*** 0.059***
[71.09] [41.27] [8.98]
Within 50 km 0.370*** 0.184*** 0.099***
[86.54] [44.59] [13.06]
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes
Notes: Columns (1) – (3) correspond to the set of estimates (1) – (3) in Table 2
5.2 Establishing Causality
The estimates in Table 2 do not imply causality if ethnic groups that are inherently less inclined to
attend school, were also less receptive, or attractive, to missions. We have argued from historical
evidence that this is unlikely to be the case, because indirect rule, and the availability of recaptured
and resettled slaves from Sierra Leone, were key determinants of missionary activity between ethnic
groups. The historical evidence also shows that factors such as European contact or transportation
networks were not important at the ethnic group level in Nigeria. In addition to the available river
networks (Niger and Benue), by 1928, there were already well developed rail networks crossing the
homelands of the ethnic groups.
Nevertheless, we further explore the causal effect of missionary activity on schooling outcomes
using three strategies. The first strategy we employ is to control for observable characteristics
of different ethnic groups, and the second exploits the spatial variation (by state of residence)
in missionary activity within an ethnic group. We also use an ethnic group’s distance to sea
and Timbuktu as instruments for the intensity of missionary activity after controlling for ethnic
characteristics.
5.2.1 Controlling for Observable Ethnic Characteristics
We estimate Equation (4) but add controls for variables that may be correlated with historical
missionary activity at the level of the ethnic group. These include the hierarchical structure of the
ethnic group, population density during the colonial period, and an indicator for the presence of a
city as at 1400. These measures indicate relative economic prosperity, which could be related to
an willingness to accept missionary activity and ability to fend off missionary interests.22
22We also controlled for malaria ecology in some of the regressions, and it does not change the results
we obtain. We decided to exclude it from the results reported here because, as noted earlier, malaria fever
did not negatively impact the location of mission stations. First, the prevalence of malaria fever was the
reason why European missionaries sought out Africans to go into the hinterlands as missionaries. Further
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Table 4: Missions and Ethnicity Controls
Ethnicity Missions Hierarchy City in 1400 Pop. Density
Ekoi 0.08 1.00 0.00 2.60
Fulani 0.00 3.00 0.00 N/A
Hausa 0.01 3.00 1.00 3.62
Ibibio 2.00 2.00 0.00 4.77
Igala 0.20 4.00 0.00 3.01
Ibo 1.11 2.00 0.00 4.71
Ijaw 0.25 3.00 0.00 2.38
Kanuri 0.00 4.00 1.00 3.03
Tiv 0.18 2.00 0.00 3.56
Yoruba 0.23 4.00 1.00 3.51
Table 4 shows the number of missions per 1000 km2 of the ethnic group’s homeland, and
the ethnicity control variables. First, notice that the Northern ethnic groups with cities in 1400
(Hausa and Kanuri) had virtually no missionary activity, while the only Southern group with a
city (Yoruba) had some missionary activity, but not as much as other ethnic groups with no cities
(such as Ibo and Ibibio). The same pattern can also be seen with the hierarchical organization of
the ethnic group’s communities, where we find that ethnic groups with more hierarchies beyond the
immediate community (increasing scales) tend to have less missionary activity. Again, the Hausa
and Fualni in the North presents the best contrast with the Ibo and Ibibio in the South.
The OLS estimates of equation (4) including ethnicity controls are shown in Table 5. Missionary
activity still has a strong positive effect on schooling outcomes. An extra mission station per 1000
km2 of the area of an individual’s ethnic homeland, increases years of schooling by 1.08 years on
average, and an additional mission station within 25 km increases years of schooling by .52 years.
The point estimates are smaller than those in Table 2, and this suggests some role for historical
ethnic specific characteristics for the effect of missionary activity on schooling.
Interestingly, there is an element of reversal of fortunes in Nigeria whereby ethnic groups that
had cities in 1400, and higher population densities in the pre-colonial period have less schooling
today. The estimates here provide evidence that the location of missions have played a role in this
reversal in Nigeria. Indirect rule meant that the more “advanced” ethnic groups were shielded from
missionary interference and Western forms of schooling which, we show later on, has had a positive
impact on current wealth. Thus, the reversal of fortune may have been driven by institutions (as
in Acemoglu et al. (2002)), and changes in the supply of factors of production (human capital)
brought about by contact with missionaries.
evidence that malaria did not discourage missionary activity could be seen from the fact that malaria is
more dominant in the Southern rainforest areas where there was more missionary presence. The correlation
between the measure of malaria ecology and missionary stations in the South is .65.
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Table 5: Missionary Activity and Years of Schooling (Controlling for Ethnic Observables)
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3)
Missions
Per 1000 km2 1.083***
[3.41]
Within 25 km 0.518***
[6.82]
Within 50 km 0.598***
[16.64]
City in 1400’s -3.189*** -3.203*** -0.25
[-8.96] [-12.93] [-1.08]
Pop. Density -0.540* -0.586*** -3.898***
[-2.57] [-4.27] [-17.15]
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No No
Observations 30622 30622 30622
Adjusted R2 0.561 0.583 0.557
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Indi-
vidual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, sex, and 8 occupation dummies. Household
controls include the household size, sex of the household head, age of the household head, and wealth of the
household. Ethnicity controls include an indicator for having a city in 1400, population density during the
colonial period, and the hierarchical organization of the community in pre-colonial times, taken from Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011). State fixed effects include fixed effects for 36 states and the federal capital territory.
5.2.2 Controlling for Ethnic Fixed Effects
We realize that the ethnic controls we have included may not be completely convincing to all, so
we adopt a second strategy to uncover the causal effect of missions. The strategy utilizes the fact
that traditional ethnic homeland have been separated into different states after the establishment
of these mission stations. The continuous process of state creation has generated differences in
exposure to missionary activity for individuals within an ethnic group. To implement this strategy,
we estimate the equation below:
Yi,e,h,s = αe + βMs + XiΠ + XhΓ + Xs∆ + i,e,h,s. (5)
Equation (5) is very similar to (4), except that we now include an ethnicity fixed effect and
examine the impact of missionary activity across states, Ms. All individual and household control
variables are the same, and we include control variables for the suitability of the state to agriculture,
and perhaps missionary activity. The state level controls are contained in Xs, and include a measure
the workability of land in the state, dummies for land terrain of the state and the agricultural zone
of the state. OLS estimation results are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6: Missionary Activity and Years of Schooling (Across States)
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Missions per 1000 km2 2.855*** 0.339*** 0.213* 1.073***
[16.79] [3.73] [2.37] [7.39]
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No
State Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 47660 47533 47533 47660
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.574 0.578 0.461
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Indi-
vidual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, sex, and 8 occupation dummies. Household
controls include the household size, sex of the household head, age of the household head, and wealth of the
household. State level controls include the workability of land in the state, 4 terrain fixed effects, and fixed
effects for the agricultural zone in which the state lies. Ethnicity fixed effects include fixed effects for 10
major ethnicities and a group including the other minor ethnic groups. The sample size increases because
individuals from other ethnicities are now included in the regression.
The effect of mission stations in Table 6 remains positive and statistically significant, even with
ethnic group fixed effects. In column 2, we estimate that within an ethnic group, an additional
mission station per 1000 km2 of an individual’s state of residence increases years of schooling by
.34 years, on average. The estimate falls to .21 once we control for state characteristics, and the
precision of the estimate weakens. In column 4 of Table 6, we examine the impact of including
ethnicity fixed effects. Without controlling for ethnicity, but controlling for household and state
characteristics, we find that an additional mission station increases years of schooling across states
by 1.07 on average (compared to .21 with ethnicity fixed effects).
We interpret this finding as showing that treatment at the level of the ethnic group is important
and that within an ethnic group, the location of mission stations across states may not be as
important. This is perhaps a consequence of higher rates of mobility across states, within ethnic
homelands, compared to mobility across ethnic homelands. Thus we would naturally expect to find
the effect of missionary activity to be stronger across ethnic groups than within an ethnic group
across locations.
5.2.3 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Here, we further explore the causal interpretation of the persistent effect of missionary activity on
schooling using two instruments for the intensity of missionary activity. The use of instrumental
variables solves two problems: it addresses the potential endogeneity of mission stations to ethnic
group specific characteristics and also helps us deal with problems related to measurement error
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in the intensity of missionary activity. Problems with measurement errors arise because, while we
have estimates of the number of mission stations in any given area, we do not know the size of the
mission staff nor how long they had been in the area before 1928.
The first instrument is the measure of the ethnic group’s distance to the sea. An ethnic group’s
distance to sea is negatively correlated with missionary activity because indirect rule was more
effective in the Northern parts of the country, where missionaries only arrived in great numbers
after the establishment of British colonial administration. Furthermore, ethnic groups further away
from the coast were relatively less exposed to the slave trade (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), and
were unable to attract enough missionaries who spoke the native language.23
Our second instrument is an ethnic group’s distance to Timbuktu, Mali, which was a major
centre for the trans-Saharan trade and spread of Islam in West Africa (El-Hareir and Mbaye, 2011;
Lulat, 2005). The River Niger, which flows through Timbuktu and Nigeria, provided access for
traders and Islamic missionaries to Nigeria. We conjecture that the farther an ethnic group is from
Timbuktu, the more difficult it would have been for Islamic missionaries to become established.
This would mean that, given the lack of competition from Islamic missionaries, it would have been
easier for Christian missionaries to establish themselves in areas farther away from Timbuktu. We
compute distance from Timbuktu as the shortest route from the centroid of the ethnic group’s
homeland to Timbuktu.
We use both instruments simultaneously, and also control for the ethnic group’s exposure to the
slave trade, the hierarchical structure of the ethnic group, population density during the colonial
period, and an indicator for the presence of a city as at 1400, in the regressions. The model is
estimated by two-stage least squeares (2SLS), and results are shown in Table 7. The top panel
reports second-stage results, and results from first-sage regressions follow.
In column 1 where we only control for state fixed effects and individual variables, we find that
an additional mission station increases schooling attainment by 4.8 years on average and this falls
slightly to 3.8 years once we include household controls. Controlling for the effect of the slave
trade in column 3, we find that the effect of missionary activity remains robust, with an additional
mission station increasing average years of schooling by 3.5 years. In the fourth column, we include
the full set of controls for ethnic-group characteristics and find that the number of mission stations
increases years of schooling by 2.17 years.
Column 4 also shows that exposure to the slave is positively associated with years of schooling
in Nigeria, after controlling for an ethnic group’s population density and the presence of a city in
the 1400’s. The negative effect of having a city and a higher population density, in the pre-colonial
era, on schooling provides more evidence of a reversal of fortunes between ethnic groups in Nigeria.
From the first-stage regressions, we briefly examine the relevance and strength of our instrument.
23An example is provided by that of a Kanuri recaptive Wesleyan agent, W. Allakurah Sharpe, who
desperately pleaded with the Wesleyan mission, in 1879, to send missionaries to the Kanuri in Northeastern
Nigeria. However, the mission could not afford to do this as a result of a lack of adequately trained personnel
(Ayandele, 1966, p.118).
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Table 7: IV Estimation of Effect of Missions on Schooling
Second-Stage Regressions:
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Missions per 1000 km2 4.800*** 3.821*** 3.547*** 2.170***
[8.80] [8.96] [6.94] [3.84]
Slave Exports per Area 0.124 1.434***
[0.74] [11.78]




Observations 34620 34609 34609 31100
Adjusted R-squared 0.544 0.61 0.613 0.609
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Controls No No No Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-Stage Regressions:
Dependent Variable is Missions per 1000 km2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to sea -0.00103*** -0.00103*** -0.000790*** -0.00144***
[-95.54] [-95.26] [-68.64] [-123.23]
Distance to Timbuktu 0.0656*** 0.0656*** 0.0614*** 0.0949***
[86.50] [86.30] [83.17] [140.35]
Slave Exports per Area 0.117*** -0.238***
[50.01] [-87.48]




Observations 34647 34636 34636 31126
Adjusted R-squared 0.858 0.858 0.868 0.982
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Indi-
vidual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, sex, and 8 occupation dummies. Household
controls include the household size, sex of the household head, and age of the household head. Distance to
Timbuktu is calculated as the shortest distance from the ethnic group’s centroid to the centre of Timbuktu,
Mali. The measure of the number of slaves exported per area, and ethnicity controls that include an indicator
for having a city in 1400, population density during the colonial period, and the hierarchical organization
of the community in pre-colonial times, are taken from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). State fixed effects
include fixed effects for 36 states and the federal capital territory.
As we hypothesized, distance to sea is negatively associated with missionary activity, and distance
to Timbuktu is positively associated with missionary activity. The point estimates for the both
instruments remain stable as more controls are added to the regression. Furthermore, we find that
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the adjusted R2 of the first-stage regressions are all above .86, with a Shea (1997) partial R2 of .44.
These results show that our instruments are good predictors of the intensity of missionary activity.
Lastly, we performed diagnostic the Sargan test for overidentification, and cannot reject that our
instruments are exogenous at the 5% level. In summary, the use of an instrument reveals that an
additional mission station increases years of schooling by about 2.17 years on average.
5.3 Mechanism: Missions and Education Infrastructure
This sections assess mechanisms through which missionary activity has generated sustained in-
creases in schooling attainment. An important transmission mechanism we have already identified
in previous sections are inter-generational effects. Household characteristics related to missionary
activity, especially wealth, reduce the estimated impact of historic missionary activity.24
Given the results above, an important question is why the missionary impact remains substantial
in Nigeria even after a hundred years, and three generations, within the same country? The
historical discussion showed that missionaries increased the education infrastructure in the areas
where they operated by constructing schools and providing teachers. They did this in order to
attract children to their message, and to train individuals who could carry on the missionary work.
The missionary impact on schooling was already being felt as early as 1914, when there were
37,500 primary schools in the South, but just 1,100 primary schools in the North where the colonial
government had taken primary responsibility for schooling (Csapo, 1981).
Here, we provide evidence that the missionary impact on schooling has been sustained partly
because of these early infrastructural gains. First, we show that individuals whose ancestors were
exposed to more missionary activity also tend to live in districts with more schools, even controlling
for factors that influence demand for education. Secondly, we show that, after controlling for house-
hold factors, the missionary impact on schooling is only robust at the primary level of education
where missions focused their investment efforts.
5.3.1 Missions and Current Education Infrastructure
The DHS data we use does not provide direct information on education infrastructure, instead we
use data from rounds 2, 3, and 3.5 of the Afrobarometer Survey conducted in Nigeria (ICSPR, 2003–
2008) to test for historical missionary activity and current access to education. The Afrobarometer
Survey records the presence of a school in the individual’s district of residence and the individual’s
ethnicity. Given that most Nigerians still live within ethnic homelands (see Oyeniyi (2013)), we
estimate the effect of historic missionary activity on the current probability that there is a school
within the individual’s district. We also include other controls that may determine demand for
education in the district such as age, urban/rural residence, sex, occupation, living conditions, and
24Below, we show that historical missionary activity is positively related to current household wealth, even
after controlling for education.
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level of education. The results are shown in Table 8 for linear and logistic probability models.
Table 8: Missionary Activity and Schooling Infrastructure
Dependent Variable is Probability of School in District
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Linear Probability Logit
Missions per 1000 km2 0.0443*** 0.0316*** 0.0510*** 0.0370***
[5.58] [3.91] [4.90] [3.60]
Education Level Dummy No Yes No Yes
Observations 6243 6190 6226 6173
Adjusted/Pseudo R2 0.021 0.029 0.034 0.045
Notes: Logit model reports average marginal effects. T-statistics for robust standard errors are reported in
brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Individual controls including age, age-squared, urban/rural
residence, sex, and dummies for 5 living condition and 23 occupation categories. The education dummies
indicate 10 different levels of education.
The results show that an additional mission station per 1000 km2 of an individual’s ethnic
homeland makes it more likely that there is a school in the individual’s district of residence. When
we do not control for the individual’s levels of education, we find that an extra mission station per
per 1000 km2 is associated with a 4.4 percentage-point increase in the probability of having a school
in the district under the linear specification. The average marginal effect is slightly higher with an
estimated increase of 5.1 percentage points in the logistic model. Controlling for individuals’ levels
of education reduces the average marginal effect to 3.1 and 3.7 percentage points, for the linear and
logistic models respectively. Thus, after controlling for the demand of education (education levels),
individuals historically exposed to greater missionaries activities are more likely to live in district
with schools.
Overall, the estimates provide evidence that the infrastructural gains brought by missionary
activity have been sustained into the present time. To further assess whether these infrastructural
advantages explain the sustained educational advantages associated with historical missionary ac-
tivity, we test the effect of missionary activity on the probability of completing different levels of
education.
5.3.2 Missions and Level of Education Completed
It is well known that missionaries were primarily interested in “basic education,” and primarily
invested in basic education infrastructure. They widely shunned further levels of education as those
served no further evangelistic purpose (Ayandele, 1966, p. 284–290, 293). The regular curriculum
emphasized the four R’s: religion, reading, writing, and arithmetic (Ajayi, 1965, p.139). While there
were large differences in primary schools in 1928 Nigeria, there were very few secondary schools
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(and no universities) in the country during this time period.25 Thus if increased infrastructure is
responsible for the sustained educational attainment associated with missionary activity, we expect
to find that the impact of missionary activity is strongest at the basic education level.
To assess this implication, we examine the effect of missionary activity on the probability
of completing different levels of education, conditional on having completed the preceding level
(controlling for demand). We estimate separate linear and logistic probability models of schooling
attainment at three different levels of education, and the results are shown in Table 9. In the
models, we also allow the effect of historical missionary activity to vary by sex in order to capture
any heterogeneity.26
Table 9: Missionary Activity and Probability of Completing Different Levels of Education
Dependent Variable is Probability of Completing Level of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear Probability Logit
Primary Secondary Higher Primary Secondary Higher
Missions per 1000 km2 0.120*** 0.0436** -0.00735 0.154*** 0.0221 -0.00567
[8.01] [2.86] [-0.72] [3.93] [1.47] [-1.19]
Male 0.228*** 0.151*** 0.0265*** 0.187*** 0.157*** 0.0521***
[24.37] [19.47] [5.50] [28.54] [25.10] [12.61]
Missions*Male -0.148*** -0.109*** -0.00554
[-15.08] [-9.69] [-0.73] — — —
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34104 34104 34104 34104 34104 34104
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.581 0.336 0.55 0.488 0.418
Notes: Logit model reports average marginal effects, and is estimated with an interaction term which
is negative and statistically significant at the 99.99% level. We cannot report a marginal effect for the
interaction term because of technical reasons. T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Individual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence,
and 8 occupation dummies. Household controls include the household size, sex of the household head, age
of the household head, and wealth of the household. State fixed effects include fixed effects for 36 states and
the federal capital territory.
The estimates show that the impact of missionary activity is strongest at the primary level, and
there is very little impact of missionary activity on the probability of completing secondary and
higher levels of education (conditional on completing the preceding level). The average marginal
effect of missionary activity on all levels of education is similar in both the linear and logistic
models. From the linear probability model, we find that historical exposure to missionary activity
25For the development of higher education in Africa see (Ajayi et al., 1996), where we find less than 30
secondary schools in Nigeria as at 1928.
26We fully investigate the differential effects of missionary activity by sex in subsequent sections.
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increases the probability of completing primary schooling by 12%, the probability of completing
secondary education is increased by 4.4%, and we find no effect on the probability of completing
higher education. In the logistic model, we find a slightly stronger effect of missionary activity on
the probability of completing primary education (15%), but there is no evidence that missionary
activity increased the conditional probabilities of completing higher levels of education.
The result in Table 9 is not surprising, because missionaries emphasized basic education at
the expense of education at higher levels, which was primarily left for the government. This
reinforces our emphasis on the importance of changes in schooling infrastructure brought about by
missionary activity in explaining the persistent effects of missions on educational attainment. The
results above lead us to conclude that, controlling for household factors, the effect of missionary
activity is primarily due to increasing the supply of schooling at the basic education level.
Note that if the persistence was driven by a simple change in tastes for schooling, we might
expect to see the probability of completing all levels of education increasing with missionary activity
which is not borne out by the evidence in Table 9. The linear probability model also shows that
the effect of historical missionary activity runs through increasing basic education for females,
with the marginal impact for males close to zero. The same is true for the logit model, where
we find a statistically significant negative interaction term. This is consistent with the prediction
of our model regarding the impact of increased education infrastructure on males and females in
proposition 2 which we further investigate below.
5.4 Missions and Schooling: Heterogeneous Effects
5.4.1 Missionary Activity and Schooling by Sex
One of the implications of the model of education laid out earlier is that the marginal impact
of missionary activity would be higher for women compared to men, because missionary activity
reduced education costs by increasing education infrastructure (proposition 2). The intuition is
that the marginal effect of increased schooling infrastructure on attainment would be stronger for
women, because of the higher marginal benefit of schooling due to labour market discrimination.27
We would expect the impact of missionary activity to be higher among women compared to men,
if missionary activity primarily increased the supply of schooling infrastructure.
To test this prediction, we estimate equation (4) but now allow the effect of missionary to
differ by sex. The results are presented in Table 10. The first column of the table shows that
men in Nigeria have an average of 3 more years of schooling compared to women. However, an
additional mission station increases years of schooling by 4.18 years for women and 2.3 years for
men, on average. This suggests that missionary activity across ethnic groups had a stronger effect on
female education. In the second column, we see that household factors (effect on earlier generation)
27The lower educational attainment of women can be seen in Table 10, and the implied higher marginal
returns to schooling for women in Nigeria is documented by Aromolaran (2006).
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account for about half of the impact of missions, with the point estimate for women dropping from
4.18 years to 2.13 years of schooling for an additional mission station.
Table 10: Missionary Activity and Years of Schooling (Effect by Sex)
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Muslims Only
Missions per 1000 km2 4.184*** 2.129*** 1.113*** 8.119***
[19.87] [15.59] [6.16] [5.59]
Male 3.017*** 2.466*** 2.738*** 3.117***
[27.66] [26.49] [30.26] [19.42]
Missions*Male -1.841*** -1.320*** -1.605*** -4.426***
[-12.63] [-10.66] [-12.46] [-4.78]
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 34187 34076 34076 18102
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.555 0.633 0.551
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Individual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, and 8 occupation dummies. Household
controls include the household size, sex of the household head, age of the household head, and wealth of the
household. State fixed effects include fixed effects for 36 states and the federal capital territory.
Once we control for state fixed effects in the third column of Table 10, the only significant
effect of missionary activity is almost exclusively on female education. An additional mission
station increases female education by 1.11 years on average, but for males, the effect is actually
slightly negative (but insignificant). Further, as shown in column 4 of Table 10, when the model
is estimated on Muslims only, the effect on males is now positive but still substantially less than
the effect on females. This is consistent with the stronger effect of missionary activities in Muslim
areas predicted by proposition 3.
These results are consistent with our model in which increases in the supply of schooling in-
frastructure leads to a greater increase in enrollment for women compared to men. The results
in Table 10 are, however, not fully consistent with a framework where the demand for education
increases as a result of increases in “taste” for schooling. If benefits rose as a result of increases in
tastes for schooling, we would not expect to see a differential impact on men and women if there
is no labour market discrimination, and should predict a greater impact on men in the presence of
discrimination.
While the evidence discussed above rules out a gender-neutral change in tastes for education,
we cannot rule out gender-specific changes in tastes for education. A related interpretation of
this finding is that it may be due to changes in gender values brought about by the Protestant
ethic of missionaries. First, this is somewhat at odds with the finding that even among Muslims,
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the impact of missionary activity on female education remains greater than the impact on male
education. Secondly, while some historical sources provide evidence that missionaries encouraged
the education of women and children who were perceived as less “valuable,” there is also evidence
that education was biased towards men for economic reasons. For example, in the Niger Delta
areas, more boys were sent to schools compared to girls because the Chiefs felt that, unlike girls,
the boys could grow up to participate in trade. The Chiefs of Bonny, for example, asked “what
profit is there to us for girls?” They felt that it was not prudent to send girls to school, because
“they cannot trade on board ships when they grow up only live in the house” (Tasie, 1978, as quoted
in p.34). This is, of course, additional evidence of the existence of labour market discrimination
against women.
5.4.2 Role of Religion
How important is religion for the impact of missionary activity on schooling? To answer this
question, we restrict the sample to Muslims and Christians, and estimate equations (4) and (5).
The results are shown in Table 11.
Using the ethnicity level measure of missionary activity, and including state fixed effects, we
find that an additional mission station increases years of schooling by almost 7 years, on average,
for Muslims. Also, looking at the cross-state measure with ethnic group fixed effects, we find a
smaller estimate of 3 years with no state-level controls. When we control for state-level features,
the point estimate drops to .78, which is still larger than the point estimate of .21 in the sample
as a whole. Under both measures, we find the estimated effect of missionary activity on schooling
to be larger among Muslims compared to Christians. These results imply that missionary activity
did not increase schooling simply because of Christianity
The results are consistent with proposition 3 of our model, because compared to Christians, the
increase in the supply of school infrastructure as a result of missionary activity was less in Muslim
areas. In our data, we find the average number of mission stations per area of the individual’s
ethnic homeland is .68 if the individual is a Christian today, but only .05 for current Muslims.
This implies that the the marginal impact of missionary activity should be higher among Muslims,
because average schooling infrastructure (mission stations) is lower in Muslim areas.
Historical sources also document the effect of missionary activity on schooling even among
non-converts, primarily because of the demonstrable material benefits of schooling. In Lagos,
for example, Yoruba Muslims who had initially resisted sending their children to mission schools
out of fear of Christian influences, began to change their stance by 1900 and started to enroll in
large numbers (Ayandele, 1966, p.300). Muslims in Northern Nigeria, on the other hand, did not
have this option as a result of the prohibition of missionary activity in these areas. This effectively
meant that the variation in the historical supply of missionary activity (schooling) is larger between
Muslims compared to the variation between Christians.28 This is reflected to the estimated larger
28In our data, the estimated coefficient of variation in historical missionary activity among Muslims is
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Table 11: Missionary Activity and Schooling Among Muslims
Dependent Variable is Years of Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ethnicity-Level Measure State-Level Measure
Missions per 1000 km2 11.42*** 6.749*** 3.036*** 0.803*
[11.14] [5.05] [7.44] [2.07]
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls No Yes
State Fixed Effects No Yes
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 18102 18102 22547 22470
Adjusted R-squared 0.534 0.549 0.492 0.525
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Indi-
vidual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, sex, and 8 occupation dummies. Household
controls include the household size, sex of the household head, age of the household head, and wealth of
the household. State level controls include the workability of land in the state, 4 terrain fixed effects, and
fixed effects for the agricultural zone in which the state lies. Ethnicity fixed effects include fixed effects for
10 major ethnicities and a group including the other minor ethnic groups. State fixed effects include fixed
effects for 36 states and the federal capital territory. The sample size increases for the state-level measure
because individuals from other ethnicities are now included in the regression.
marginal impact of missionary activity among Muslims.
Once again, we cannot completely rule out the importance of Protestant values, because Mus-
lims living in close proximity to mission stations may acquire similar ethics, even if they do not
convert. However, we can rule out the nominal role of religion. Thus, these gains in schooling could
have been accomplished without mass conversions to Christianity. This somewhat justifies the
colonial administration’s policy of non-interference by missions, but also indicts the administration
for failing to adequately provide schooling alternatives.
5.5 Effect on Wealth: Reversal of Fortunes
Lastly, we assess the extent to which historic missionary activity has contributed to prosperity in
modern Nigeria. To this end, we regress household wealth on intensity of missionary activity and
other individual, household, and ethnic group, controls. The model is estimated by OLS and 2SLS,
using distance to the sea and distance to Timbuktu as instruments for the intensity of missionary
activity. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 12.
We find that historic exposure of an individual’s ethnic group to missionary activity is positively
associated with the individual living in a wealthier household today. Examining the OLS results, we
181.446, which is larger than the coefficient of variation of 81.9 among Christians.
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see from Column 1 of Table 12 that, after controlling for individual and household characteristics,
and including state fixed effects, an additional mission station in an individual’s ethnic homeland
is associated with a .24 increase in the wealth index of the household in which the individual lives.
This is a substantial rise, because the wealth index ranges from 1 to 5. In standardized terms,
the estimate implies that a 1-standard deviation rise in the number of mission stations per 1000
km2 is associated with a .15-standard deviations increase in the wealth index. The 2SLS estimates
yield a much larger impact of schooling on wealth, with an additional mission station increasing
the wealth index of the individual’s household by .68.
The effect of missionary activity on wealth is consistent with a human capital model. In the
second column, we find that some of the effect of missionaries on wealth is accounted for by the
higher years of schooling induced by missionary activity. Introducing schooling into the regression
decreases the estimated impact of missionary activity on wealth to .16, and the 2SLS estimates
also falls to .24. However, the effect historical missionary activity remains positive and significant,
which suggests that not all of the effects of missionary activity on wealth can be attributed to
higher levels of schooling attainment.
In the next set of columns (3–5), we assess the role of missionary activity in the “reversal of
fortunes” between Nigerian ethnic groups by including measures correlated with pre-colonial pros-
perity. Specifically, we control for slave exports per area of ethnic homeland, an indicator for having
a city in 1400, population density during the colonial period, and the hierarchical organization of
the community in pre-colonial times. In column 3, we find that ethnic groups with cities in the
15th century have less wealth today, and score .45 less on the wealth index. The same is true for
ethnic groups with a higher population density in the colonial area, who score .43 points less on
the wealth index (which ranges from 1–5).
An interesting finding from columns 3–5 is that individuals from ethnic groups more intensively
exposed to the slave trade have higher levels of wealth today. In column 4, we find that some of the
positive effect of the slave trade on wealth is attributable to higher levels of schooling as a result
of missionary activity. This is most clearly seen from column 4 of the the 2SLS estimates where
we see that, controlling for schooling, the positive effect of the slave trade falls by about half and
the positive effect of missions on wealth becomes insignificant. Put differently, once we control for
the positive correlation between missionary activity, schooling, and the slave trade, as in a 2SLS
regression, missionary activity has a small effect on wealth.
From the 2SLS estimates in column 4, we also see that most of the reversal of fortunes is
accounted for by the lower levels of missionary activity, and thus schooling, among ethnic groups
who were more prosperous before missionary contact. In fact, once we control for years of schooling,
the negative effects of the presence of a city and population density become weak and insignificant
at conventional levels. This is important because it suggests another mechanism through which
ethnic groups who were once prosperous in precolonial times now lag behind. While some of this
reversal is due to institutional changes at the national level, as in Acemoglu et al. (2002), the results
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Table 12: Missionary Activity, Household Wealth, and Reversal of Fortunes
Dependent Variable is Household Wealth
OLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Missions per 1000 km2 0.239*** 0.155** 0.326** 0.333*** -0.0607
[3.64] [3.09] [3.00] [3.49] [-0.37]
Years of Schooling 0.0923*** 0.0956*** 0.0853***
[22.09] [20.29] [20.88]
Slave Exports per Area 0.502*** 0.274*** 0.142**
[13.71] [8.09] [3.19]
City in 1400’s -0.454*** -0.0701 0.0256
[-4.41] [-0.78] [0.21]
Pop. Density -0.428*** -0.233*** 0.133
[-5.39] [-3.60] [1.06]
Observations 34636 34609 31126 31100 31100
Adjusted R-squared 0.592 0.646 0.526 0.593 0.627
2SLS Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Missions per 1000 km2 0.675*** 0.236* 0.456* 0.128 -0.198
[4.44] [1.97] [2.27] [0.73] [-0.86]
Years of Schooling 0.0920*** 0.0956*** 0.0852***
[22.35] [20.24] [20.83]
Slave Exports per Area 0.490*** 0.293*** 0.147**
[12.07] [7.69] [3.28]
City in 1400’s -0.375* -0.196 -0.0554
[-2.46] [-1.54] [-0.35]
Pop. Density -0.483*** -0.146 0.213
[-4.74] [-1.75] [1.40]
Observations 34636 34609 31126 31100 31100
Adjusted R-squared 0.587 0.645 0.526 0.592 0.627
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethnicity Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes
Notes: T-statistics for clustered standard errors in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Instruments for missionary activity are an ethnic group’s distance to the sea, and an ethnic group’s distance
to Timbuktu. Individual controls include age, age-squared, urban/rural residence, sex, and 8 occupation
dummies. Household controls include the household size, sex of the household head, and age of the household
head. Ethnicity controls include measures of slave exports per area of ethnic homeland, an indicator for
having a city in 1400, population density during the colonial period, and the hierarchical organization of the
community in pre-colonial times, taken from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011). State fixed effects include fixed
effects for 36 states and the federal capital territory.
here show that schooling investments by missionaries has played an important role in Nigeria. The
relative degrees to which resource endowments and institutional changes have transformed African
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economies, upon European contact, remains an important topic for future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that early investments in education infrastructure by missionaries is
still positively related to schooling attainment in Nigeria. This result holds for ethnic groups living
in the same state, and individuals of the same ethnic group living in different states. Using an ethnic
group’s distance to sea and Timbuktu as instruments for the intensity of missionary activity, we
find that an additional mission station per 1000 km2 of an individual’s ethnic homeland increases
years of schooling by 3 years, on average. The effect of missionary activity on schooling is also seen
among Muslims which rules out the link between religion and education as the primary mechanism.
From the estimates, we find that the persistence of the relationship between missionary activity
and schooling is partly explained by the inter-generational transmission of human capital, because
early exposure to missionary activity is positively related to current household wealth in Nigeria.
We also find that the key to understanding the relationship between historical missionary ac-
tivity and schooling lies in basic education, and the basic education of females. The importance of
basic education is not surprising given that missionaries primarily invested in basic schooling. Re-
garding female education, we argue that labour market discrimination in Nigeria means that female
education is not as profitable as male education. However, an increase in schooling infrastructure
lowers the marginal cost of female education, and this explains the larger effect of missionary ac-
tivity on education attainment for females. Finally, we briefly show that exposure to missionary
activity has led to increased wealth even after controlling for years of schooling.
Our study shows that exposure to missionary activity is an important determinant of the relative
prosperity of different societies upon European contact. This goes beyond the well known influences
of colonial governments and European traders. While this paper has focused on the missionary
impact on human capital in modern Nigeria, we also recognize that missionaries may have also
influenced cultural values and institutions. The complete effects of missionary activity on income
and wealth is left for future research.
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